Raiders of the lost spacetime by Wuthrich, Christian
Raiders of the lost spacetime
Christian Wu¨thrich∗
For Dennis Lehmkuhl (ed.), Towards a Theory of Spacetime Theories. Birkha¨user.
Abstract
Spacetime as we know and love it is lost in most approaches to quantum gravity. For many of
these approaches, as inchoate and incomplete as they may be, one of the main challenges is to
relate what they take to be the fundamental non-spatiotemporal structure of the world back to
the classical spacetime of GR. The present essay investigates how spacetime is lost and how it
may be regained in one major approach to quantum gravity, loop quantum gravity.
Keywords: quantum gravity, problem of time, quantum GR, loop quantum gravity, emergence
of spacetime.
Many approaches to quantum gravity (QG) suggest or imply that space and time do not exist at the
most fundamental ontological level, at least not in anything like their usual form. Thus deprived of
their former status as part of the fundamental furniture of the world, together, perhaps, with quarks
and leptons, they merely ‘emerge’ from the deeper physics that does not rely on, or even permit,
their (fundamental) existence, rather like tables and chairs. The extent to which the fundamental
structures described by competing approaches to QG diverge from relativistic spacetimes varies,
along different dimensions (Huggett and Wu¨thrich 2013). That modern physics puts time under
pressure is widely accepted. One can read the history of modern physics from the advent of
relativity theory to the present day as a continuing peeling away of the structure that time was
initially believed to exemplify (Huggett, Vistarini, and Wu¨thrich 2013, §2.1). But at least in some
approaches, spacetime as a whole comes under siege. This may occur in the relatively mild sense
that the fundamental structure turns out to be discrete; or it may be discrete and non-local, as it
happens in loop quantum gravity (LQG); or the reality of some dimensions of space is questionable
altogether, as it is in theories with certain dualities; or it may exhibit non-commutativity among
different dimensions, obliterating the usual geometric understanding that we routinely have of
spacetime.
Just how radical the departure from the spacetime we know and love is remains to be seen,
but it is likely to have profound implications. For instance, it may render some of our cherished
philosophical theories not just of space and time, but also of persistence, causation, laws of nature,
and modality obsolete, or at least in need of revision (Wu¨thrich 2012). But this paper will be
concerned with the consequences for the physics, rather than the metaphysics. Two urgent, and
related, issues arise. First, one might worry that if it is a necessary condition for an empirical
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science that we can at least in principle measure or observe something at some location at some
time. The italicized locution, in turn, seems to presuppose the existence of space and time. If that
existence is now denied in quantum theories of gravity, one might then fear that these theories bid
adieu to empirical science altogether. It thus becomes paramount for advocates of these theories
to show that the latter only threaten the fundamentality, but not the existence of space and time.
To discharge this task means to show how relativistic spacetimes re-emerge and how measurable
quantities arise from the fundamental structure as postulated by the theory at stake.
This first issue is closely related to a second problem: a novel theory can supplant an incumbent
theory only if it recreates at least most of the empirical success of the old theory. The way in which
this requirement is typically met in physics is by showing how the newer theory offers a more
general framework than the older one, and that therefore the older is a special case of the newer,
which can be regained, or at least mocked in formally suggestive ways, in some limit or to some
approximation. For instance, it was important to Albert Einstein to be able to show that one
obtains from general relativity (GR), in a weak-field limit, a theory which returns essentially all
the same empirical results in the appropriate regime as Newtonian gravitational theory. This
recovery mattered because the Newtonian theory garnered impressive empirical successes over the
more than two centuries preceding Einstein’s formulation of GR. For the very same reason, present-
day quantum theories of gravity must eventually prove that they relate, in physically salient ways,
to the classical GR that the last century of observations has found to be so accurate.1 In fact, given
the complete absence of direct empirical access to the quantum-gravitational regime, establishing
this link with ‘old’ physics arguably constitutes the single most important constraint on theorizing
in the quantum-gravitational realm.
Consequently, in theories of lost spacetime, relativistic spacetimes must be regained from the
fundamental structure in order to discharge the tasks of securing both the theory’s empirical co-
herence and its account of why the theory it seeks to supplant was as successful as it was. It is
the goal of this essay to show just how spacetime vanishes and how it might be seen to re-emerge
in one important approach to quantum gravity, LQG. Since the emergence of spacetime from a
non-spatiotemporal structure is often thought to be impossible, establishing the mere possibility of
such emergence assumes vital importance.2
The next section, Section 1, explicates how time, rather than spacetime, disappears in a class
of approaches to QG, the so-called ‘canonical’ theories. Canonical QG casts GR in a particular
way, and the section will show how time and change vanish already at the level of GR so cast.
Section 2 then investigates the fundamental structures as they are described by LQG and discusses
the two main ways in which they differ from relativistic spacetimes, viz. in their discreteness and
their non-locality. The following section, Section 3, starts to clear the path for the re-emergence of
relativistic spacetime by arguing how the emergence relation should not be construed in the present
case. Specifically, it argues against a non-reductive understanding of emergence and an attempt to
cash out the relation between the structures in terms of unitary equivalence as both inadequate to
the task at hand. Next, Section 4 sketches a way in which the relationship between fundamental
spin networks and relativistic spacetimes might be worked out and tries to understand what it
would generally take to relate them. Section 5 offers brief conclusions.
1Given this formidable success of the classical theory, one might wonder why we need a quantum theory of gravity
at all. There are good reasons to think that we do, but they do not fully align with the standard lore one finds in
the physics literature (Wu¨thrich 2013, §1).
2For a very recent critical view, see e.g. Lam and Esfeld (2013).
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1 The problem of time in canonical general relativity
Casting GR as a Hamiltonian system with constraints has many advantages, as John Earman (2003)
affirmed: it gives the vague talk about ‘local’ and ‘global’ transformations a more tangible meaning,
it explains how the fibre bundle formalism arises in the cases it does, it has a sufficiently broad
scope to relate GR to Yang-Mills gauge theories, it offers a formalization of the gauge concept, and
it connects to foundational issues such as the nature of observables and the status of determinism
in GR and in gauge theories. Moreover, the Hamiltonian formulation affords a natural affinity to
the initial value problem in GR.3 The real gain of a Hamiltonian formulation, however, arises when
one tries to quantize the classical theory. Typically, prescriptions to find a quantum theory from
a classical theory require either a Lagrangian (e.g. for the path integral method) or a Hamiltonian
(e.g. for canonical quantization) formulation of the theory. LQG relies on a canonical quantization
procedure and thus uses a Hamiltonian formulation of GR as a starting point.4,5
However, forcing GR, to use the words of Tim Maudlin (2002, 9), “into the Procrustean bed of
the Hamiltonian formalism” also comes, as conveyed by the quote, at a cost. The cost arises from the
fact that the Hamiltonian formalism tends to construe the physical systems it describes as spatially
extended three-dimensional objects evolving over an external time, and this is no different for the
Hamiltonian formulation of GR.6 Recasting GR in a Hamiltonian formalism thus reinterprets the
four-dimensional spacetimes of standard GR as three-dimensional ‘spaces’ which evolve in a fiducial
‘time’ according to the dynamics governed by Hamilton’s equation. Pulling space and time asunder
in this way, of course, contravenes the received view of what many take to be the deepest insight
of relativity, viz. that no separation of the fundamental spacetime into space and time can in any
physically relevant way be privileged. This blatant violation of four-dimensionalism, of course, gets
mathematically mended in the formalism through the imposition of constraints. But we are getting
ahead of ourselves. What this brief paragraph should suggest is that having a philosophically closer
look at the dynamics of this reformulation of classical GR is worth our while.7
A spacetime is an ordered pair 〈M, gab〉 consisting of a four-dimensional pseudo-Riemannian
manifold M and a metric tensor field gab defined on M. Starting out from the Einstein-Hilbert
action S[gab] for gravity without matter,
S[gab] =
1
16piG
∫
M
d4x
√−gR, (1)
where G is Newton’s gravitational constant, g the determinant of the metric tensor gab, and R
the Ricci scalar, one can gain a Lagrangian formulation of GR with the dynamical Euler-Lagrange
equations in terms of a Lagrangian function L(q, q˙) of generalized coordinates q and the generalized
velocities q˙. The Lagrange function is essentially the integrand in the action integral (1) integrated
3Cf. Wald (1984, Appendix E.2). A locus classicus for the Cauchy problem in GR is Choquet-Bruhat and York
(1980); a more recent survey article is Friedrich and Rendall (2000).
4A useful introduction to the Lagrangian and the Hamiltonian formulation of GR is given in Wald (1984, Appendix
E). Wald’s textbook of 1984 only deals with the ADM version of Hamiltonian GR and, as time travel was not yet
invented in 1984, does not treat Ashtekar’s version, pioneered in 1986.
5Of course, for most cases we care about, Hamiltonian theories afford a corresponding equivalent Lagrangian
theory, and vice versa. Currently, a debate rages in philosophy of physics over which of the two, if any, is more
fundamental or more perspicuous. Nothing I say here should be taken to entail a stance in that debate.
6There are, of course, purely internal degrees of freedom of particles, such as classical spin, which admit of a
Hamiltonian treatment without the system necessarily being extended in space. Now, even a point particle with
internal degrees of freedom is at least a physical system in space, and it certainly also evolves over external time.
7In connection with what follows, Chapter 1 of Henneaux and Teitelboim (1992) is recommended reading. For a
less formal and hence more accessible treatment of the problem of time, cf. Huggett et al. (2013, §2) and references
therein. Cf. also Kiefer’s contribution to this collection.
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over the three spatial dimensions. This action leads to the (vacuum) field equations of GR if
one varies (1) with respect to the metric gab. Thus, Einstein’s vacuum field equations can be
recognized as the equations of motion of the Lagrangian formulation of GR, i.e. as the Euler-
Lagrange equations. They are second-order differential equations. The solutions to the Euler-
Lagrange equations will be uniquely determined by q, q˙ just in case the so-called ‘Hessian’ matrix
∂2L(q, q˙)/∂q˙n
′
∂q˙n of L(q, q˙), where n labels the degrees of freedom, is invertible. This is the case
if and only if its determinant, confusingly sometimes also called ‘Hessian’, does not vanish. In case
the determinant of the Hessian vanishes, which means the Hessian is ‘singular’, the accelerations q¨
will not be uniquely determined by the positions and the velocities and the solutions to the Euler-
Lagrange equations are not only not unique in q and q˙, but also contain arbitrary functions of time.
Thus, the impossibility of inverting ∂2L(q, q˙)/∂q˙n
′
∂q˙n is an indication of gauge freedom. How such
gauge freedom arises in constrained Hamiltonian systems is the topic of the next subsection, §1.1,
followed by an analysis in §1.2 of how this lesson carries over into the context of Hamiltonian GR
and leads to the problem of time.
1.1 Hamiltonian systems with constraints
Finding a Hamiltonian formulation amounts to putting the Euler-Lagrange equations in the form
of Hamiltonian equations of motion, q˙ = ∂H/∂p and p˙ = ∂H/∂q, which are of first order. This can
be achieved by the introduction of canonical momenta via
pn =
∂L
∂q˙n
, (2)
where n = 1, ..., N , N being the number of degrees of freedom of the system at stake. These
momenta are not all independent when we are faced with a system exhibiting gauge freedom—i.e.
just in case the Hessian is singular. These dependencies get articulated in constraint equations
φm(q, p) = 0, m = 1, ...,M, (3)
where M is the number of dependencies. The relations (3) between q and p are called primary con-
straints and define a submanifold smoothly embedded in phase space called the primary constraint
surface. The phase space Γ is defined as the space of solutions of the equations of motion. Assuming
that all equations (3) are linearly independent, which may not be the case, this submanifold will be
of dimension 2N −M . Equations (3) imply that the transformation map between the Lagrangian
phase space Γ(q, q˙) and the Hamiltonian phase space Γ(q, p) is onto but not one-to-one. Equations
(2) define a mapping from a 2N -dimensional manifold of the q’s an q˙’s to the (2N−M)-dimensional
manifold defined by (3). In order to render the transformation bijective and thus invertible, the
introduction of extra parameters—‘gauge fluff’—is required.8
Next, one introduces a Hamiltonian H as a function of position and momentum variables as
H(q, p) = q˙npn − L(q, q˙). (4)
This canonical Hamiltonian is uniquely defined only on the primary constraint surface but can
arbitrarily be extended to the rest of phase space. The ‘Legendre transformation’ defined by (2)
turns out to be invertible just in case det(∂2L/∂q˙n
′
∂q˙n) 6= 0. Should the determinant of the Hessian
vanish, as above, one can add extra variables um and thus render the Legendre transformation
8For more details on how the constraints arise in some Hamiltonian systems, see Henneaux and Teitelboim (1992,
Ch. 1). My exposition largely follows this reference.
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invertible. In this case, the Hamiltonian equations corresponding to the Euler-Lagrange equations
become
q˙n =
∂H
∂pn
+ um
∂φm
∂pn
,
p˙n = −∂H
∂qn
− um∂φm
∂qn
,
φm(q, p) = 0.
These Hamilton equations lead via arbitrary variations δqn, δpn, δum (except for the boundary
conditions δqn(t1) = δqn(t2) = 0 and that they must conserve H) to the Hamiltonian equations of
motion for arbitrary functions F (q, p) of the canonical variables
F˙ = {F,H}+ um{F, φm}, (5)
where {, } is the usual Poisson bracket
{F,G} := ∂F
∂qi
∂G
∂pi
− ∂F
∂pi
∂G
∂qi
.
Consistency requires that the primary constraints φm be preserved over time, i.e. that φ˙m = 0.
As primary constraints are phase space functions, equation (5) then implies
{φm, H}+ um′{φm, φm′} = 0. (6)
This equation has one of two possible forms: either it embodies a relation only between the q’s and
p’s, without any um, or it results in a relation including um. In the latter case, we just end up with a
restriction on um. In the former case, however, (6) leads to additional constraints, called secondary
constraints, on the canonical variables and thus on the physically relevant region of the phase space.
These secondary constraints must also fulfill the consistency requirement of being preserved over
time, which leads to new equations of the type (6), which again are either restrictions on the um or
constraints on the canonical variables, etc. Once the process is finished, and we have all secondary
constraints9, denoted by φk = 0 with k = M + 1, ...,M + K, all constraints can be rewritten as
φj = 0 with j = 1, ...,M + K =: J . The full set of constraints φj = 0 defines a ‘subsubmanifold’
in the phase space Γ, i.e. a submanifold of the primary constraint surface φm = 0, called the
constraint surface C. The relevant difference between primary and secondary constraints is that
primary constraints are direct consequences of equation (2), whereas the secondary constraints only
arise once the equations of motion (5) are given.
Any two functions F and G in phase space that coincide on the constraint surface are said to
be weakly equal, symbolically F ≈ G. In case they agree throughout the entire phase space, their
equality is considered strong, expressed as usual as F = G. Above, I have introduced the qualifi-
cation of constraints as primary. However, there is a more important classification of constraints
into first-class and second-class constraints, defined as follows:
Definition 1 (First-class constraints). A function F (q, p) is termed first class if and only if its
Poisson bracket with every constraint vanishes weakly,
{F, φj} ≈ 0, j = 1, ..., J. (7)
If that first-class function is a constraint itself, then we call it a first-class constraint. A function
in phase space is called second class just in case it is not first class.
9They are not referred to as tertiary, quaternary etc. constraints, but only collectively as ‘secondary’ constraints.
5
The property of being first class is preserved under the Poisson bracket, i.e. the Poisson bracket
of two first-class functions is first class again.
The fact that arbitrary functions um enter the Hamilton equations (or, equivalently, the Hamil-
tonian equations of motion) implies that a physical state is uniquely determined by a pair (q, p),
i.e. by a point in (Hamiltonian) phase space Γ(q, p), but not vice versa. In other words, these
arbitrary functions encode the gauge freedom which arises for systems with a singular Hessian. It
can be shown that a dynamical variable F , i.e. a function on Γ, differs in value from time t1 to
time t2 = t1 + δt by
δF = δva{F, φa} (8)
where the φa range over the complete set of first-class primary constraints and the va are the totally
arbitrary part of the um, with δva = (va − v˜a)δt where va and v˜a are two different choices of va
at t1.10 In a deterministic theory, the transformation (8) does not modify the physical state and is
thus considered a gauge transformation. In this sense, the first-class primary constraints generate
gauge transformations. The famous ‘Dirac conjecture’ attempts to extend this result to include
all first-class constraints as generating gauge. In general, however, the conjecture is false as the
existence of some admittedly contrived counterexamples illustrates.11 There is no harm for present
purposes, however, if we assume that all first-class constraints generate gauge transformations. The
restriction of a phase space function F to C is gauge-invariant just in case {F, φa} ≈ 0, in which
case (8) implies δF ≈ 0. The first-class constraints are thus seen to generate motions within C. In
contrast, second-class constraints generate motions leading outside of C.12 This distinction permits
the explication of another important concept: the gauge orbit. A gauge orbit is a submanifold of C
which contains all those points in C which form an equivalence class under a gauge transformation.
The sets of these points are path-connected in C since gauge transformations that connect these
points are continuous and do not leave C. They form a curve in C. The gauge motion produced by
the first-class constraints can thus be seen to be the tangents to these curves. The points of the
gauge orbits in C, equipped with a projection C → Γphys, constitute the so-called reduced or physical
phase space Γphys. The physical phase space Γphys is defined as the set of points representing gauge
equivalence classes of points in Γ. In other words, the physical phase space is obtained by identifying
all points on the same gauge orbits. This means that the bundle of admissible dynamical trajectories
passing through a particular point x ∈ C is mapped to the physical phase space such that the bundle
is projected onto a single dynamical trajectory through the point in Γphys representing the gauge
equivalence class in which x falls.
Assume a Hamiltonian system with constraints is given. Assume further that all constraints
are first-class.13 Constraint equations are equations which the canonical variables must satisfy in
addition to the dynamical equations of the system. If a set of variables were to determine one and
only one physical state, then, given the existence and uniqueness of the solutions of the dynamical
equations, one could plug the set of variables uniquely specifying the state into the dynamical
equations and could thus obtain the full deterministic dynamical evolution of the physical degrees of
freedom. If constraints are present, however, a set of variables does not uniquely describe a physical
10Cf. Henneaux and Teitelboim (1992, §1.2.1).
11Cf. Henneaux and Teitelboim (1992, §1.2.2).
12Cf. Belot and Earman (2001, §10.2.2).
13Second-class constraints can be regarded as resulting from fixing the gauge of a ‘larger’ system with an additional
gauge invariance. They can be replaced by a corresponding set of first-class constraints which capture the additional
gauge invariance. Second-class constraints are thus eliminable. In fact, in some cases, it may prove advantageous
to thus ‘enlarge’ a system as this permits the circumvention of some technical obstacles (Henneaux and Teitelboim
1992, §1.4.3), albeit at the price of introducing new ‘unphysical’ degrees of freedom. Without loss of generality, we
can thus consider a Hamiltonian system whose constraints are all first-class.
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state. Solving the constraints thus means to use these additional equations to explicitly solve for
a variable. This permits the elimination of this variable (and the now solved constraint equation).
Solving the constraints of the constrained Hamiltonian system thus amounts to the reduction of the
number of variables used to specify the physical state of the system. Once all constraint equations
are solved and thus eliminated, the remaining canonical variables are ineliminable for the purpose
of uniquely specifying a physical state. In this case, we are back to an unconstrained Hamiltonian
system in the sense that its phase space is its physical phase space. In the absence of any second-class
constraints, the total number of canonical variables (= 2N) minus twice the number of first-class
constraints equals the number of independent canonical variables. Equally, the number of physical
degrees of freedom is the same as half the number of independent canonical variables, or the same
as half the number of canonical variables minus the number of first-class constraints.14
1.2 Gauge freedom in Hamiltonian general relativity
Hamilton’s equations, at least in the narrower standard sense, explicitly solve for the time deriva-
tives. This can only be achieved within GR if its original 4-dimensional quantities are broken up
into (3+1)-dimensional quantities, with time accruing in the one single dimension. Similar coercion
must be exercised upon the four-dimensional structure of spacetime, nota bene, when we wish to
consider an initial-value formulation of GR. In order to find a Hamiltonian or an initial-value for-
mulation, GR must be regarded as describing the dynamical evolution of something. Breaking up
spacetime into ‘space’ that evolves in ‘time’ in order to determine whether a well-posed initial-value
formulation exists, i.e. whether the physical degrees of freedom enjoy an at least minimally stable
deterministic evolution, becomes manageable once we impose a gauge condition to weed out any
unphysical degrees of freedom. The traditional formulation of GR as a constrained Hamiltonian
system entertains twelve dynamical variables, the six independent components of the three-metric
qab and the six independent components of the corresponding conjugate momentum piab. Half this
number is six, and there are four first-class constraint equations, which leaves the gravitational field
with two physical degrees of freedom per point in space. Fortunately, this is the same number of
degrees of freedom as one gets for a linear spin-2 field propagating on a flat spacetime background,
which can be considered as a weak-field limit of GR.15 With a gauge condition enforced, Einstein’s
field equations can be massaged into a form of hyperbolic second-order differential equations de-
fined on manifolds which admit existence and uniqueness theorems. Even in an appropriate gauge
fix, however, GR allows for ways in which the field equations may fail to uniquely determine their
solutions.16
The conceptually most momentous consequence of casting GR as a constrained Hamiltonian
system is that the Hamiltonian H is itself a constraint bound to vanish on the constraint surface of
the phase space. This is what ultimately leads to the ‘problem of time’, a conceptual tangle in the
foundations of Hamiltonian GR and of quantizations relying thereon, consisting of essentially two
strands, the disappearance of time as a fundamental magnitude and the ‘freezing’ of the dynamics.
14This manner of counting the physical degrees of freedom is well defined for any finite number of degrees of
freedom, and perhaps for countably many too. For uncountably many degrees of freedom, new subtleties arise. Cf.
Henneaux and Teitelboim (1992, §1.4.2).
15See Wald (1984, §4.4b); cf. also Wald (1984, 266) for a slightly different way of calculating the degrees of freedom
of the gravitational field.
16For an explanation of the failures of determinism in this setting, cf. Wu¨thrich (2006, §4.1), on which the past
few pages have been based. Also, and at the peril of burying an absolutely central point in a footnote, this severance
of space and time threatens the general covariance so central to GR. How general covariance gets implemented in
Hamiltonian GR and the subtleties that arise in doing so are discussed in Wu¨thrich (2006, §4.4). What follows
explicates the gist of this implementation.
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The first aspect, the vanishing of time as a fundamental physical magnitude, is suggested at the
classical level by the increasing elimination of time in classical physics, leading up to Hamiltonian
GR, as it is retraced in Huggett et al. (2013, §§2.1 and 2.2). However, there is a sense in which it
only comes to full fruition in quantum theories, as will be elaborated below.
The freezing of the dynamics—more aptly called the ‘problem of change’—, however, fully
appears at the classical level. A crucial premise of the argument leading to the problem of change
is that only gauge-invariant quantities can capture the genuinely physical content of a theory. This
premise is justified by pointing to the fact that two distinct mathematical models of a theory
describe the same physical situation just in case they are related by maps which are interpreted as
‘gauge’ transformations. Of course, it may be controversial for any given theory just which maps
ought to be considered ‘gauge’, but I take the justificatory fact invoked in the previous sentence
to be analytic of what it means to be ‘gauge’, viz. to capture a representational redundancy not
reflective of the true physical situation. In other words, the premise stipulates that the physical
content of a theory is exhausted by the gauge-invariant quantities as codified by the theory. The
concept of ‘Dirac observables’ tries to capture this idea in the context of constrained Hamiltonian
theories:
Definition 2 (Dirac observables). A(n equivalence class of) Dirac observable(s) is defined as the
(set of those) function(s) in phase space that has (have) weakly vanishing Poisson brackets with all
first-class constraints (and coincide on the constraint surface). Equivalently, Dirac observables are
functions in phase space which are constant along gauge orbits on the constraint surface.
Thus, if the premise is true, and if the gauge-invariant quantities of a constrained Hamiltonian
theory are precisely its Dirac observables as defined in Definition 2, then the physical content of a
constrained Hamiltonian theory is exhausted by its Dirac observables.
In order to determine the physical content of Hamiltonian GR, thus, it becomes paramount to
identify its first-class constraints. I will not execute this task here with the mathematical precision
it deserves but rest content with a conceptual motivation.17 The vantage point is the principle of
general covariance so central to GR. This principle demands that the Einstein equations’ dynamical
symmetry group Diff(M) of active spacetime diffeomorphisms is the gauge group of GR.18,19 In
other words, active spacetime diffeomorphisms, which map a solution of the dynamical equation to
another solution, ought to be considered relating two mathematically distinct solutions describing
one and the same physical situation.20 Thus, general covariance is spelled out as gauge invariance
under active spacetime diffeomorphisms.
In the Hamiltonian formalism, the dynamical symmetry of GR gets encoded as constraints
which generate the spacetime diffeomorphisms in the sense explained in §1.1. In the standard
formulation of GR, the elements of the symmetry group Diff(M) are defined as maps between
four-dimensional manifolds. The Hamiltonian formalism breaks this four-dimensionality down to
a three-plus-one-dimensional rendering; accordingly, Diff(M) breaks down into a group of three-
dimensional ‘spatial’ diffeomorphisms and a group of one-dimensional ‘temporal’ diffeomorphisms.
This move is not without subtleties, as expounded in Wu¨thrich (2006, §4.2): the symmetry group
17For a somewhat rigorous execution in the case of the so-called ADM and Ashtekar-Barbero versions of Hamil-
tonian GR, cf. Wu¨thrich (2006), §4.2.1 and §4.2.2, respectively.
18A spacetime diffeomorphism is a one-to-one and onto C∞-map from M onto itself which has a C∞-inverse.
Diffeomorphisms induce transformations in the fields defined on the manifolds. Intuitively, a map between manifolds
is active if it ‘moves around’ the points without recourse to any coordinate system. Thus, an active transformation
is not a change in coordinate systems, but a transformation pushing around the physical fields on the manifold. But
this metaphorical picture should be enjoyed with the adequate mathematical caution.
19This is the received view, but it should be noted that there has been recent dissent, e.g. in Curiel (2009, §3).
20For a detailed analysis and justification, cf. Wu¨thrich (2006, §3, particularly §3.2).
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in Hamiltonian versions of GR differs from that in the usual articulation of the theory, thus distin-
guishing Hamiltonian GR from its standard cousin in yet another way from those given at the end
of the section. In the exemplary ADM version of Hamiltonian GR, the spacetime diffeomorphisms
are generated by normal and tangential components of the Hamiltonian flow. Since the constraints
generating the diffeomorphism must vanish (weakly), these components of the Hamiltonian vanish
(weakly). Furthermore, in a Hamiltonian theory, it is the Hamiltonian which generates the dy-
namical evolution via the Hamilton equations. Since the Hamiltonian is constrained to vanish, the
dynamics gets ‘frozen’.
More specifically, (the normal component of the) Hamiltonian is a first-class constraint. Thus,
the Dirac observables must have weakly vanishing Poisson brackets with the Hamiltonian and
thus turn out to be constants along the gauge orbits generated by the Hamiltonian. This accords
with the stipulation above that the physical-content-capturing Dirac observables must be invariant
under gauge transformations, here constituted by active spacetime diffeomorphisms. Since the
Dirac observables are constant along orbits generated by the Hamiltonian, all genuinely physical
magnitudes must be constants of the motion, i.e., they must remain constant over time. In other
words, any supposed change is purely a representational redundancy, and not a physical fact. Thus,
the argument concludes, there is no change! Since GR, or any quantum theory of gravity replacing
it, is a fundamental theory, we are saddled with the uncomfortable task of explicating how time and
change can arise phenomenologically—which they undoubtedly do—in a fundamentally changeless
world. O quam cito transit gloria temporis.21
Avoiding this unpalatable conclusion might be all too easy by simply brushing aside Hamiltonian
GR as a failed articulation of the theory. But this move is not readily available, at least not without
some considerable cost. A prima facie justification for brushing it aside points out that Hamiltonian
GR is not theoretically equivalent to the standard formulation of GR. It is true: Hamiltonian
GR presupposes that spacetimes can always be sliced up to conform to its (3 + 1)-dimensional
framework, but this is demonstrably false in GR. Thus, Hamiltonian GR at best captures the sector
of GR containing sliceable, globally hyperbolic spacetimes. Furthermore, known articulations of
Hamiltonian versions of GR exclude any matter content from the spacetimes and thus only codify
vacuum spacetimes. It is not clear, however, that this inequivalence suffices to evade the strictures
of the above argument. And most importantly, Hamiltonian formulations of GR serve as the asis
for one of the most important family of approaches to formulating a quantum theory of gravity.
By virtue of this fact alone, they deserve to be taken seriously, not just mathematically, but also
philosophically.
2 How spacetime dissolves in LQG
Once the classical theory is cast in a Hamiltonian fashion, then it can be subjected to the powerful
canonical quantization technique. This procedure, pioneered by Paul Dirac, converts the canonical
variables of the classical theory into quantum operators defined on an appropriately chosen Hilbert
space. The Poisson bracket structure of the classical level is thereby transposed to give rise to
the canonical commutation relations obtaining between the basic operators in the quantum theory.
From these basic operators, more complex operators can be built up. The classical constraint
functions get translated into such complex operators acting on elements in the Hilbert space, thus
turning the constraint equations into wave equations. Since they are constraint equations, the
constraint operators annihilate the states on which they are acting. Only those states which are
21For a discussion of philosophical reactions to this situation, cf. Huggett et al. (2013, §2.3).
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so annihilated by the constraints operators are considered physical states. As usual in quantum
mechanics, the Hamiltonian operator Hˆ generates the dynamics via a Schro¨dinger-type equation.
As we have seen in §1.2, in Hamiltonian formulations of GR, the Hamiltonian itself becomes a
constraint. In the quantum theory, we get
Hˆ|ψ〉 = 0 (9)
which is demanded to hold for all physical states |ψ〉. The ‘physical’ Hilbert space H consists just
of those states, which satisfy all constraints, i.e., are annihilated by all constraint operators in the
theory. Equation (9), also called the ‘Wheeler-DeWitt equation’, gives a very direct intuition of
both the problem of time and that of change. Concerning the problem of time strictly so called,
comparing (9) to the ordinary Schro¨dinger equation,
Hˆ|ψ〉 = i~ ∂
∂t
|ψ〉, (10)
we notice the absence of the time parameter t in (9). This is indicative of the problem of time: the
absence of time from the fundamental picture. Quite literally, time drops out of the equation in
Hamiltonian quantum gravity.
Given that (9) plays the role of the dynamical equation in quantum Hamiltonian GR just as
(10) does for ordinary quantum mechanics, we also glean the first traces of the quantum version of
the problem of change by recognizing that the time derivative vanishes. Analogous to the classical
case, constraint operators generate the gauge symmetries of the theory. Accordingly, the criterion
for the gauge-invariant observables, the Dirac observables defined in Definition 2 of the quantum
theory, gets translated as requiring that functions Fˆ of operators represent Dirac observables just
in case they commute with all the constraint operators Cˆi
[Fˆ , Cˆi]|ψ〉 = 0,
for all i = 1, ...,m, where m is the number of constraints, and for all |ψ〉 in H. This entails
that every Dirac observable must commute with the Hamiltonian. Since the Hamiltonian is what
generates the dynamical evolution of the states, all Dirac observables must thus be constants of the
motion, i.e., not changing over time. However, the Dirac observables also exhaustively capture the
physical content of the theory, at least according to the premise stated in §1.2. Thus, no genuine
physical magnitude changes over time. Hence, the dynamics of the world described in canonical
quantum gravity is ‘frozen’ in time. There simply is no change at the most fundamental level
described by these Hamiltonian quantum theories of gravity! Change, as it turns out, only arises
as a representational artefact—‘gauge’—with no physical counterpart in the fundamental theory.
Unlike at the classical level, where arguably the strictures of the argument can be evaded, at
least to some extent, by avoiding Hamiltonian formulations of GR, this is evidently not possible
for quantizations based on them as the problem is built right into the framework. Perhaps we
ought to have expected such an outcome—after all, GR teaches us that time is not external to the
physical systems of interest but itself partakes as part of spacetime in dynamical interactions with
the material content of the universe, which constitute the usual physical systems physics describes.
In other words, time is part of the physical system we are trying to quantize.
In fact, indications persist that quite generically in quantum gravity space and time, at least
as standardly understood in GR, no longer form part of the fundamental ontology. Instead, space
and time, or at least one or the other, are ‘emergent’ phenomena that arise from the basic physics.
As it is used in the present essay, ‘emergent’ should not be taken as the terminus technicus in
philosophy that designates properties which are not even weakly reducible. Rather, it should be
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considered as an umbrella term for a relationship that may well turn out to be reductive, as will
be argued in §3.1. In fact, to characterize the exact nature of this relationship is the ultimate goal
of the research addressing the issue at stake. In the language of physicists, spacetime theories such
as GR are ‘effective’ theories trading in ‘emergent’ phenomena, much like thermodynamics is an
effective theory dealing with the emergent phenomenon of temperature, as it is built up from the
collective behaviour of gas molecules. However, quite unlike the fact that temperature is emergent,
the idea that the universe and its material content is not in space and time shocks our very idea of
physical existence as profoundly as any previous scientific revolution did.
So there is at least a sense in which time vanishes in canonical approaches to quantum gravity.
It has been argued that because string theory contains GR “in some limit... [t]he disappearance
of external time should... also hold in string theory” (Kiefer 2012, 10). As a consequence of the
holographic principle, space as well can be considered emergent in string theory (Huggett et al.
2013). Furthermore, the fundamental structures postulated by various quantum theories of gravity
diverge significantly from the familiar spacetimes of GR. For instance, so-called non-commutative
geometry replaces the basic geometric picture we have of spacetime by algebraic relations between
temporal and spatial coordinates or directions and generalizes multiplicative relations among them
so that they no longer commute. This generalization has weird consequences and renders the basic
structure conceptually quite different from spacetime (Huggett et al. 2013). As another example,
the fundamental structure generically turns out to be discrete rather than continuous. For a vast
class of quantum theories of gravity, Lee Smolin, takes discreteness to be “well established.” (2009,
549).
Of course, one might react to these developments as John Earman did, at least concerning LQG,
and insist that
although classical general relativistic spacetime has been demoted from a fundamental
to an emergent entity, spacetime per se has not been banished as a fundamental entity.
After all, what LQG offers is a quantization of classical general relativistic spacetime,
and it seems not unfair to say that what it describes is quantum spacetime. This entity
retains a fundamental status in LQG since there is no attempt to reduce it to something
more fundamental. (2006, 21)
If this is just a quarrel over words, I have no appetite to engage in it. We are free to call LQG’s
fundamental structure, to be described in the remainder of this section, ‘quantum spacetime’ all
right, but given the profound departures from relativistic spacetimes, the use of a different term is
not only warranted, but also preferable, as I have argued elsewhere (Wu¨thrich 2012). Let us leave
this debate to one side and delve into the physics in order to get a sense of what it is LQG theorizes
about.
2.1 Introducing LQG
Canonical quantum gravity generally, and LQG in particular, attempt to transpose the central
lesson of GR into a quantum theory. The pertinent key innovation of GR is the recognition
that spacetime does not passively offer a fixed ‘background’ which determines the inertial ‘forces’
acting on the physical content of the universe, but instead a dynamical structure which interacts
with matter. To repeat, LQG is based on a reformulation of GR as a ‘Hamiltonian system’,
which reinterprets spacetimes as (3 + 1)-dimensional rather than 4-dimensional, with constraints.
Thus, recasting GR as a Hamiltonian theory forces a ‘foliation’ of its spacetimes by an equivalence
relation into three-dimensional ‘spatial’ hypersurfaces, parametrized by a one-dimensional ‘time’.
The natural interpretation of the Hamiltonian system would be that of a three-dimensional ‘space’
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considered as a dynamical physical system which evolves over ‘time’, where the three-dimensional
hypersurfaces would represent the instantaneous state of the dynamical theory.
LQG is thus a canonical quantization of Hamiltonian GR.22 Before we proceed, let it be noted
that the particular formulation required entails a substantive limitation of the approach: only
‘globally hyperbolic’ spacetimes of the classical theory are considered. If a spacetime is globally
hyperbolic, then it is topologically ‘3 + 1’, i.e., the topology of M is Σ × R, where Σ is a three-
dimensional submanifold of M.23 Just how severe this limitation is is debatable; many physicists
do not consider it troubling, some philosophers have dissented. To impose global hyperbolicity as
a necessary condition for physically reasonable spacetimes amounts to asserting a strong form of
the merely conjectured, but not proven, cosmic censorship hypothesis. Dissenting voices cautioning
against stipulating global hyperbolicity as necessary include Earman (1995), Erik Curiel (2001),
Chris Smeenk and Wu¨thrich (2011), and John Manchak (2011). Manchak (2011, 414) proves that
as long as a spacetime is not “causally bizarre”, it is observationally indistinguishable from another
spacetime, not isometric to the first and not globally hyperbolic, yet with exactly the same local
properties. From this, Manchak concludes that “[i]t seems that, although our universe may be...
globally hyperbolic..., we can never know that it is.” (ibid.) In the light of this result, it appears
brash to enthrone global hyperbolicity as a sine qua non of physical reasonability. Having said that,
however, if LQG were to be a huge empirical success, its premises would be vindicated. Note the
future subjunctive tense in the previous sentence.
There currently still persists another, uncontroversially problematic, limitation of the approach:
only vacuum spacetimes are considered, i.e., the classical vantage point of the approach is the
vacuum sector of GR with everywhere vanishing energy-momentum. This technical simplification
comes at the price of rendering it unclear whether the resulting quantum theory can deal with a
non-zero energy and matter content of the universe, presumably a necessary condition for giving
an empirically adequate account of the actual world. The situation may not be quite as bleak
for LQG as this may suggest, for three reasons. First, vacua are physically important states and
their theoretical understanding may shed decisive light on the necessary steps leading to a more
general theory encompassing matter. Secondly, the assessment as to whether or not models of a
theory or vacuum states of the universe contain matter may come apart for classical and quantum
theories. In other words, the quantum theory which started out from classical vacuum states may
be interpreted to contain matter. This possibility does not come without further complications,
though: the emerging matter may well be highly non-local and may violate most or all energy
conditions. Thirdly, and most speculatively, matter, just as space and time, may emerge from
the—perhaps topological or combinatorial—properties of the fundamental structure and hence not
be present at the fundamental level.
The goal of the quantization is to find the Hilbert space corresponding to the physical state
space of the theory and to define operators on the Hilbert space representing the relevant physical
magnitudes. The hope would naturally be that some of the latter make contact to the empirically
testable. In order to get the quantization started, one chooses a pair of canonically conjugate
variables which coordinatizes the relevant sector of the classical phase space. Different choices
lead to different quantum theories: geometrodynamics’s choice is the induced three-metric on the
three-hypersurface and its conjugate momentum constructed from the external curvature of the
three-hypersurface, LQG starts out from Abhay Ashtekar’s ‘new variables’ of a connection Aia and
its conjugate, a densitized triad ‘electric field’ Eai and constructs a ‘holonomy’ and its conjugate
22For a thorough introduction to LQG, cf. Rovelli (2004); for the mathematical foundations, cf. Thiemann (2007).
Rovelli 2011 is a recent review article.
23For a more systematic explication of global hyperbolicity and neighbouring concepts, see Smeenk and Wu¨thrich
(2011, 593).
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‘flux’ variables from them. The geometrical structure of the classical phase space is encapsulated in
the canonical algebra given by the Poisson brackets among the basic variables. This structure gets
transposed into a quantum theory by first defining an initial functional Hilbert space of quantum
states |ψ〉. The basic canonical variables are turned into operators whose algebra is determined by
their commutation relations arising from the classical Poisson brackets. The classical constraints,
which are functions of the canonical variables, now become operators constructed ‘isomorphically’
as functions of the basic operators. Classically, the constraint functions are set to zero; in the
quantum theory, they annihilate the states. Thus, by imposing the constraints, the theory effectively
demands that only states which are annihilated by all constraint operators are considered physical.
Dynamical equations, as was already clear at the outset of this section, play a somewhat different
role. In a sense, given that the ‘Schro¨dinger-like’ equation of the quantum theory is the constraint
equation (9), there is no additional dynamical equation governing any ‘dynamics’ of the theory.
In LQG, three families of constraints arise. First, the so-called ‘Gauss constraints’ indicate a
rotational gauge freedom of the triads and generate an infinitesimal SU(2) transformation in the
internal, as opposed to spacetime, indices (indicated by letters from the middle of the alphabet).
These are comparatively straightforward to solve. Next, we find three ‘(spatial) diffeomorphism’
constraints, which generate the spatial diffeomorphisms on the three-hypersurfaces. These con-
straints are hard to solve, but it has been done. The resulting Hilbert space, i.e., the Hilbert space
we obtain from the states which get annihilated by the Gauss and diffeomorphism constraints, is
called the ‘kinematical Hilbert space’ and will here be denoted by HK . Finally, there is the Hamil-
tonian constraint which has so far defied solution. In fact, it is not even clear what the concrete
form of the formal equation (9) is. In this sense, LQG is not yet a complete theory. As will hope-
fully become clear later in the essay, there remain plenty of reasons not to walk away from LQG,
at least not just yet.
Given the technical and conceptual difficulties with the ‘dynamics’ (9), various authors have
sought ways to circumvent the standard conceptualization of dynamics in a Hamiltonian theory.
One main approach conceives of the dynamics in ways similar to perturbative approaches to quan-
tum field theory, taking elements of HK as three-dimensional ‘initial’ and ‘final’ ‘spaces’ and com-
pute transition amplitudes between them (Rovelli 2011, §3). Or alternatively, as Carlo Rovelli has
suggested, the states in the physical Hilbert space may not be ‘states at some time’; instead, they
are ‘boundary states’, i.e., states describing quantum space surrounding a four-dimensional region
of spacetime.24
Because (9) is not solved yet, all results must remain preliminary. One way to see this immedi-
ately is to remind the reader that all Dirac observables must commute with all constraints. If we
accept that the set of Dirac observables is identical to the set of genuine physical magnitudes, as
arguably we should on pain of introducing gauge-dependent quantities, then we cannot determine
the physical magnitudes yet, as we don’t know the explicit form of Hˆ and so cannot determine
which operators commute with it. It thus remains open whether any of the geometric operators to
be introduced shortly really corresponds to a genuine physical magnitude.
Let us study the structure of HK then. It turns out that so-called ‘spin network states’ provide
a useful basis in HK .25 These spin network states are interpreted to be the quantum states of
the gravitational field. Since physical ‘space’ will be in a state in HK , as §4.2 will suggest, it
will generally be in a quantum superposition of spin network states. Spin network states can
be represented by abstract labelled graphs as in Figure 1,26 as they are completely characterized
24A more detailed analysis of dynamics in LQG can be found in Wu¨thrich (2006, §5.3).
25For the technical background of this basis and its interpretation, cf. Rovelli (2011, §2.3)
26More precisely, they are represented by labelled graphs embedded in some background space. Thus, they are
not invariant under spatial diffeomorphisms, i.e., when they are ‘pushed around’ on the embedding manifold. In
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Figure 1: A spin network state is characterized by an abstract graph with ‘spin’-representations on
the nodes and the links between them.
and uniquely identified by three types of ‘quantum numbers’. The first label characterizes the
abstract graph Γ, the second the irreducible SU(2)-(hence ‘spin’) representations jl on the links
and a third the SU(2)-representations on the nodes, denoted by in. It should be emphasized that
the abstractness of the graph is central to the correct interpretation of the emerging picture here:
the spin network states are not quantum states of a physical system in space; rather they are the
quantum states of physical space.
The spin network states |Γ, jl, in〉 are eigenstates of the so-called area and volume operators de-
fined onHK . The spectra of these operators yield important information concerning the geometrical
interpretation of the spin network states, although it must be emphasized that the interpretation
of the states relies, in turn, on an interpretation of these operators as geometric. Since we study
the properties of the gravitational field via the geometry of the physical space, the properties of
(three-dimensional) gravitational fields are determined by the spectral properties of the area and
volume operators. These operators, which will be discussed in greater detail in §4.2, turn out to
have discrete spectra (Ashtekar and Lewandowski 1997, 1998, 1999; Rovelli and Smolin 1995a,b).
The granularity of the spatial geometry—the ‘polymer’ geometry of space—follows from the dis-
creteness of the spectra of the volume and the area operators. Essentially, each node (and only
the nodes) in the network contributes a term to the sum of the volume of a region. On each node,
there sits an ‘atom’ of space with volume Vn, as it were. These elementary grains of space are
separated from each other by their surfaces of contiguity. Just as the volume operator receives
contributions from the nodes of a region, the area operator acquires contributions from all the links
that intersect the surface. For instance, the surface whose only intersecting link is a link with
quantum number jl has a surface area of Al ∝
√
jl(jl + 1) (Rovelli 2004, §6.7). Thus, the ‘size’
of the surface connecting adjacent ‘chunks’ of ‘space’ is constructed from the spin representations
sitting on the relevant links. Thus, the smooth space of the classical theory is supplanted by a
discrete quantum structure displaying the granular nature of space at the Planck scale. Continuous
space as we find it in classical theories such as GR and as it figures in our conceptions of the world
is a merely emergent phenomenon.27
Physical three-space, in Rovelli’s interpretation, is a quantum superposition of spin network
order to fully solve the diffeomorphism constraints, then, we need equivalence classes of spin network states under
three-dimensional diffeomorphisms on the background manifold. Sometimes, these equivalence classes, represented
by abstract labelled graphs, are called ‘s-knot states’ in the literature. So I am being slightly sloppy by using the
locution ‘spin network states’ ambiguously.
27It should be kept in mind, however, that these operators are not Dirac observables and should therefore be taken
with a grain of salt. They are partial observables in the sense of Rovelli (2002).
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states, analogously to the physical electromagnetic field consisting of a superposition of n-photon
states. LQG predicts the existence of indivisible quanta of volume, area, and length, as well as their
spectra (up to a constant). Importantly, this discreteness was a result of the loop quantization,
rather than an assumption. According to LQG, measurements of the Planck geometry of space
must therefore yield one of the values in the spectrum of the concerned operator.
As mentioned above, the ‘dynamics’ of canonical LQG are only known in formal outline. As in
any Hamiltonian theory, the dynamics of the theory is generated by the Hamiltonian operators Hˆ,
which is defined on HK , via the Wheeler-DeWitt equation (9). The space of the solutions of (9)
will constitute the physical Hilbert space H. But since there exist several inequivalent versions of
Hˆ—all of which may be false—the Hilbert space H has not yet been constructed and the theory
remains incomplete.
Before we start to consider how spacetime emerges from the fundamental structures of LQG—
spin network states—, let us make sure that it has indeed vanished from the fundamental ontology.
Of course, as Earman suggested in the quote above, we might simply call the spin-network structure
‘quantum spacetime’ and move on with it. To use homonyms, or near-homonyms, for two rather
different structures, however, promises to create more confusion than comprehension. The spin
networks diverge from classical relativistic spacetimes in at least two crucial points. First, unlike
the continua of classical physics, they are discrete. As was observed above, many expect the
fundamental structure in quantum gravity to be discrete and this expectation is certainly borne
out in many of the extant approaches. This is a significant departure, but may not sway everyone
to discontinue considering the fundamental structure a ‘spacetime’.
Arguably, however, the deeper divergence from classical spacetimes arises from the ‘non-localities’
that we find in spin networks (and in many other quantum structures).28 How these fundamental
structures can be ‘non-local’ needs a bit of explaining, given that (non-)locality is a spatiotempo-
ral, or anyway a spatial, concept. To appreciate the sense in which the spin networks do contain
‘non-localities’, consider a fundamental relational structure consisting of a set of basal atoms, which
exemplify, in pairs, a basal ‘adjacency’ relation. Together with an intrinsic ‘valence’ attributed to
each of the atoms and each of the exemplified relations, this yields a connected structural complex
of the kind we find in LQG. Contrast this with the spatiotemporal structure we find in GR, where
the spatiotemporal, indeed metric, relations obtaining between the spacetime events give rise to
a locality and neighbourhood edifice. Now, these two structures are supposed to be related by
an emergence relation. More specifically, the idea is that the exemplified fundamental structure
is related, in some limit or in some approximation or at some scale, to a relativistic spacetime.
Given two particular structures related in this way, one can map the atoms of the fundamental
structure onto events in the spacetime. What it then means to say that there are ‘non-localities’
present in the fundamental structure is that some pairs of adjacent basal atoms, i.e., pairs of atoms
exemplifying the fundamental adjacency relation, get mapped onto events in the spacetime which
can be at arbitrarily large distances now as measured in the metric of the emerging spacetime.29
Locality is notoriously tricky in GR, of course, but in globally hyperbolic relativistic spacetimes, a
precise notion of locality is readily available. Given a possibly physically privileged foliation, a spa-
tial metric is induced on the leaf containing the events, which are thus spatially related. This now
permits an explication of locality e.g. in terms of convex spatial neighbourhoods of events. Thus,
what is adjacent in the fundamental structure in general is not local or nearby in the emerging
spacetime as judged by the latter’s induced spatial metric.
From the perspective of the emerging spacetime, the spin networks generally get the locality
28Cf. e.g. Markopoulou and Smolin (2007).
29Cf. Figure 1 in Huggett and Wu¨thrich (2013).
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structure wrong, or so one would expect. The expectation that these non-localities are generic
arises from the fact that relation between spin networks and classical spacetimes—to the extent
to which we understand it—is many-to-one.30 In other words, there are in general many spin
network states whose best classical approximation is the same relativistic spacetime. Since these
spin networks are physically distinct, and one of the main ways in which they can differ is by their
connectivity defined by the obtaining adjacency relations, spin networks with distinct topologies
will be best approximated by one and the same spacetime. As spin networks that give rise to
realistically large universes will consist of very many adjacent pairs of nodes, it seem natural to
think that at least some of them will be non-local in the present sense. If this is right, then non-
localities generically arise in spin networks, and we have a second deep departure of the latter from
relativistic spacetimes.
These non-localities are suppressed in the low-energy approximation from the spin network to
the relativistic spacetime. In fact, they must be suppressed, for otherwise they would have to be
emulated by the emerging structure in the sense that these adjacency relations would re-occur in the
spacetime in the form of neighbouring relations and thus not qualify as ‘non-localities’. To repeat,
‘non-localities’ of the relevant sort are fundamental adjacencies with no vicinity-type counterpart in
the emerging spacetime. If the course graining attendant to the emergence of spacetime from spin
network states—of which more in §4—would not ‘wash out’ the non-local connections, they would
have to be encoded in the emerging relativistic spacetime, perhaps as non-local ‘wormholes’. If,
however, their presence were so strong as to preclude essentially local physics at comparatively low
energy scales, such as described by quantum field theory on relativistic spacetime backgrounds, then
the corresponding theory, or at least model, would have to be considered empirically inadequate.31
So we would expect those non-localities to be generically present, but suppressed in the coarse
graining to macroscopic scales.
Relativistic spacetimes arguably differ in significant ways in how they conceptualize space and
time from our intuitive concepts of space and time. But whatever differences these are, they do not
suffice to call into question why we refer to the structures of GR as ‘spacetimes’, and justifiably
so. Whatever the differences between intuitive space and time and spacetime in GR may be, it
is clear that the departures of LQG from the manifest image run much deeper. Not only is the
fundamental structure discrete and non-local, but as we have seen in §1, the problem of time in
its different forms illustrated how our common concepts of time, change, and dynamics and the
way these concepts are standardly encoded in physical theories and their languages completely and
utterly fails. Even though this failure was enunciated in §1 at the classical level already, it crucially
depended on the particular non-standard, and inequivalent, formulation of GR necessary for the
canonical programme to get going. If we could directly quantize GR from its standard formulation,
the resulting theory’s departure from classical spacetime physics might be milder. But alas, no
promising strategy along these lines is known.
I conclude that we can safely assume that spacetime has been lost, at least in its traditional,
relativistic sense, somewhere in the transition from GR to LQG. Now that the Babylonians of quan-
tum gravity have removed spacetime from its sacred place, amid rampant speculation concerning
its whereabouts, serious efforts have commenced to recover the lost spacetime and restore it to its
lawful place. He or she who recaptures it may be blessed with wisdom—or be smitten, as the case
may be.
30Cf. Section 4. Cf. also Markopoulou and Smolin (2007, §2) who give a related reason.
31This does not entail that the fundamental non-localities could not have observable consequences, such as those
proposed by Prescod-Weinstein and Smolin (2009).
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3 What emergence of spacetime is not
In order to honour the covenant—and to avoid being smitten—, then, let this section clarify what
the emergence of spacetime could not be. First, §3.1 explains the difference between the standard
concepts of ‘emergence’ as they figure in philosophy and physics, respectively, and states that it is
the physicists’ use that will be relevant for our purposes. Secondly, it will be argued in §3.2 that
the use of the notion of ‘unitary equivalence’ will not serve to determine whether spacetime still
maintains fundamental existence in LQG.
3.1 Non-reductive relation
The concept of ‘emergence’ has a venerable history in philosophy: arguably stretching back to
Aristotle and Galen, it attracted renewed interest in the nineteenth century, reflected in the work
of George Henry Lewes, John Stuart Mill, and C D Broad in Britain, and Nicolai Hartmann on the
continent. Despite some variation among them, authors in this tradition as well as contemporary
philosophers use the term so as to imply a non-reductive relation between the emergent and the
fundamental, presupposing that reality is somehow layered into different ‘strata’ and that the
properties and relations attributed to entities at different levels in general differ from one another.
The general spirit of the concept is well captured by Brian McLaughlin’s definition in terms of
supervenience:
Definition 3 (Emergent property). “If P is a property of w, then P is emergent if and only if
(1) P supervenes with nomological necessity, but not with logical necessity, on properties the parts
of w have taken separately or in other combinations; and (2) some of the supervenience principles
linking properties of the parts of w with w’s having P are fundamental laws.” (McLaughlin 1997,
39)
Definition 3 only gets traction if all the terms in the definiens are defined in their turn. Let us
briefly discuss some of them. The first clause in the definition betrays the physicalist underpinnings
of the version of emergentism which I assume here as standard. As McLaughlin (1997, §3) explains,
the relevant notion of ‘supervenience’ in this context is based on the idea of a “required-sufficiency
relationship” (ibid.), i.e., that the possessing of a higher-level property requires the possessing of
a lower-level property which in turn suffices for the possessing of the higher-level property. This
supervenience should not be forced by logic alone, but instead result from contingent laws of nature.
To grasp the meaning and the role of the second clause, let me state the definition of ‘fundamental
law’ as given by McLaughlin:
Definition 4 (Fundamental law). “A law L is a fundamental law if and only if it is not metaphys-
ically necessitated by any other laws, even together with initial conditions.” (ibid., 39)
The second clause is necessary; for without it, Definition 3 would be overly inclusive, as
McLaughlin argues, in that reducible properties would often also qualify as emergent, against
the stated intention of the emergentists. If the laws which codify the connections between the
properties of the lower-level entities with those of the higher-level, or those of the parts with those
of the whole, are fundamental, then they are in principle not reducible to other laws governing the
properties of lower levels, thus ruling out that reducible properties qualify.32
It should be emphasized that in the context of the present study, and of much of the physics
literature on the subject, ‘emergent’ should not be understood as the terminus technicus defined
32For an up-to-date review on emergent properties, cf. O’Connor and Wong (2012).
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in Definition 3, where an emergent property (or, mutatis mutandis, an emergent entity) is not
even weakly reducible. Rather, it is to be understood as a collective designation for broadly
reductive relationships. Indeed, that is the point of the entire enterprise: to understand how
classical spacetime and its properties reduce, or more neutrally relate, to the fundamental non-
spatiotemporal structure. Reduction, as an inter-theoretic relation, can thus be regarded as a
working hypothesis of the quest to regain spacetime.
3.2 Unitary equivalence
Leaving behind the general philosophical literature, we find in the pertinent philosophy of physics a
very specific criterion which has been proposed to determine whether or not in a quantum theory of
gravity spacetime can still be regarded as fundamental or not. Almost as an aside, Craig Callender
and Nick Huggett (2001, 21) use the criterion of unitary equivalence for exactly this purpose, and
in the context of LQG! Unitary equivalence, here as elsewhere, is used as a sufficient condition
for physical equivalence. Callender and Huggett state that if bases of spin network states and of
(functionals of) three-metrics in quantum geometrodynamics are unitarily equivalent, then they
would merely constitute different representations of the same objects—viz. space—, rather than of
numerically distinct objects. Hence, if successful, unitary equivalence would establish a particularly
direct (reductive) relation, at least concerning space. If the two bases turn out to be unitarily
inequivalent, then the reductive relation will be more complex. To invoke unitary equivalence as
a (necessary and sufficient) condition for physical equivalence is well motivated.33 Despite qualms
one might entertain regarding the equivalence of the equivalences, let us grant, for the sake of
argument, that unitary equivalence and physical equivalence come together. It turns out, however,
that the criterion is nevertheless unhelpful, for three reasons.
Since unitary (in)equivalence is usually predicated of representations, not of bases, let us trans-
late the condition into the language of bases of Hilbert spaces before we start listing the problems:
Definition 5 (Unitary equivalence between bases). Two bases {|a(k)〉} and {|b(l)〉} of two Hilbert
spaces H and H′, respectively, are unitarily equivalent just in case there is a unitary map U : H →
H′ such that U |a(k)〉 = |b(k)〉 for all k.
Now, given this definition, and the orthonormality and the completeness of bases, it is easy to
construct such a unitary map between Hilbert spaces of the same dimension: U =
∑
k |b(k)〉〈a(k)|.
For our discussion below, we need to put two theorems on the table. Here is the first one:
Theorem 1 (Debnath and Mikusin´ski 1999, 3.11.3(a)). If H is an infinite-dimensional separable
Hilbert space, then it is isomorphic to l2, the space of square-summable sequences.
Two Hilbert spaces are isomorphic just in case there is a unitary map that leaves the inner
product invariant. Since being isomorphic is a transitive relation, any two infinite-dimensional
separable Hilbert spaces are isomorphic. In other words, there is a unitary map between the bases
of any two infinite-dimensional separable Hilbert spaces. This entails, of course, that for any two
infinite-dimensional separable Hilbert spaces, we can find unitarily equivalent bases in the sense of
Definition 5. In fact, we have the more general theorem:
Theorem 2 (Halmos 1951, §16). Any two Hilbert spaces H and H′ are isomorphic iff dim(H) =
dim(H′).
33At least at the level of ordinary quantum mechanics; in relativistic quantum theories, matters become more
subtle. Cf. Ruetsche (2011, §2.2).
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An immediate consequence of this theorem is that any two Hilbert spaces of the same dimen-
sion will have unitarily equivalent bases. So our knee-jerk reaction right after Definition 5 stands
vindicated. Quite generally, the theorem shows that Hilbert spaces of the same dimension are geo-
metrically indistinguishable and can thus rightfully be considered identical as far as their physically
salient structure is concerned.
Let us return to the proposal by Callender and Huggett (2001) and discuss its problems. As
announced above, there are three of them. Primo, in order for this criterion to get any traction,
the relevant Hilbert spaces would have to be known—but they are not. We have already seen that
the physical Hilbert space H of LQG has not yet been constructed, only its kinematic Hilbert space
HK . The same is true for geometrodynamics, where the constraints are non-polynomial and so far
defy solution. No Hilbert space, no basis. No basis, no checking for unitary equivalence. But let
us proceed, again for the sake of argument, on the assumption that we had the relevant Hilbert
spaces.
Secundo, the criterion, although perhaps necessary, is far removed from anything close to a
sufficient condition, at least on its own. Consider the following three exhaustive possibilities. First,
the physical Hilbert spaces of quantum geometrodynamics and LQG are both separable, i.e. they
each have a countable basis. Second, one of them is separable, but the other is not. And third,
both Hilbert spaces are non-separable, with either (a) their bases having the same cardinality, or
(b) different cardinality.
In the first case, the criterion is trivially satisfied because two bases in any two (infinite-
dimensional) separable Hilbert spaces are unitarily equivalent. In the second case, the criterion
is trivially violated, for corresponding reasons. In the third case, if the bases of the two Hilbert
spaces have the same cardinality, we are back to the first situation; if they do not, we find ourselves
in the second case again. So either way, the criterion by itself is not very illuminating and clearly
not sufficient. It would have much more bite—and that may be the unarticulated intention behind
Callender and Huggett’s proposal—if it were augmented by some additional condition such as the
preservation of the characteristic algebraic relations among the operators (such as the canonical
commutation relations) in the transformation from one to the other.
Tertio, the Callender-Huggett criterion gives the metric codification, which is used in quantum
geometrodynamics, undue precedence over the connection codification, which is LQG’s vantage
point, in that it assumes that only the first captures the geometric essence of relativistic spacetimes.
At least classically, both the metric and the connection descriptions are equally respectable ways
of capturing the geometry of a spacetime and I see no reason to elevate one at the expense of the
other. So we might, with equal justification, demand that a quantum theory of gravity offers a
description of a quantum spacetime just in case a basis of its physical Hilbert space is unitarily
equivalent to the connection basis of the physical Hilbert space of a quantum theory of gravity
based on a connection representation.34 Such a choice would be, of course, vulnerable to the same
charge raised here.
Thus, unitary equivalence between a basis of the physical Hilbert space of a theory in question
and the three-metrics basis of quantum geometrodynamics is certainly not sufficient to think that
the fundamental structure proposed by the theory in question is still spacetime. Perhaps it is
not even necessary. But even if the criterion were valuable, we would still be faced with a rather
complete dissolution of the classical continuous and local spacetime structure into granular structure
with odd non-localities, represented by labelled graphs. And the question would still naturally
arise how come our world looks like it is well described at sufficiently large scales by relativistic
34Strictly speaking, LQG basic variables are the holonomies and fluxes introduced in §2.1, which are not identical
to the connection and the canonically conjugate electric field of the connection representation but are constructed
from them.
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Classical general-relativistic spacetimes
quantization classical limit
spin network states
Figure 2: Quantization and the classical limit as ‘inverse’ tasks.
spacetimes. This explanation would still be owed, even if we managed to convince ourselves that
the fundamental structure still deserves to be called ‘spacetime’.
4 Re-emergence of spacetime
Before we venture into the enterprise of investigating how spacetime emerges from spin networks,
one mistaken argument should be put to the side. I am thinking of a Kantian who nonchalantly
responds to the present situation of the fundamental loss of spacetime by declaring that spacetime
is a ‘pure form of intuition’ and as such does not exist mind-independently anyway. So, the Kantian
continues, we should not have expected to find spacetime as an ontological posit of a fundamental
theory in the first place. But such a complacent ‘told-you-so’ reaction would be entirely misguided;
assuming space and time to be pure forms of intuition does nothing to relieve us from the obligation
to explicate how relativistic spacetimes emerge from what physics tells us is fundamental. On a
Kantian perspective, the job of physics is to describe nature as it appears to us, not as it may be an
sich. And the natural world surely appears to be spatiotemporally ordered, which is why (earlier)
physical theories made the natural assumption that there are space and time. Since physical theories
involving such postulations have been empirically very successful, any theory seeking to supplant a
theory as successful as, e.g., GR, must explain why the latter was as successful as it was given that
it is not true. In this sense, recovering spacetime from the fundamental structure becomes part of
the task of justifying the fundamental theory. This aspect assumes great urgency in a field plagued
by the lack of empirical data.
This justificatory task of understanding the emergence of spacetimes from fundamental struc-
tures such as spin networks is discharged by ‘taking the classical limit’ of the fundamental theory:
one shows that the classical theory results from an appropriate mathematical procedure which is
interpreted to physically explain why and how the proprietary effects of the fundamental theory are
hidden behind the phenomena so well represented by the classical theory. To express the situation
in Reichenbachian terms, taking the classical limit, and thus showing how relativistic spacetimes
emerge from fundamental structures, constitutes, at least partially, the ‘context of justification’.
As indicated in Figure 2, the reverse process by which we arrived at the quantum theory of gravity
from the classical theory is of course the quantization studied in §2 and can thus be understood as
the ‘context of discovery’ (of the novel quantum theory). Understanding how classical spacetimes
re-emerge is thus not only important to save the appearances and to accommodate common sense,
but also a methodologically central part of the entire enterprise of quantum gravity.
Nota bene, the quantization procedure as outlined above lacks a unique implementation for
which every step is well justified. At various steps, one can choose to follow different paths, all
20
presumably leading to inequivalent quantum theories. Some may find the fact that the construc-
tion of the quantum theory does not proceed along more principled lines troublesome. Applying
this Reichenbachian terminology also illustrates why this need not be a problem: the ‘context of
discovery’ is dominated by creative elements which defy being bound by the narrow strictures of a
research logic. On the other hand, the same traditional philosophy of science also urges that the
other direction, the ‘context of justification’, be taken very seriously. Regardless of this traditional
philosophy of science’s merits, the urgency clearly applies to the case at hand.35
‘Taking the classical limit’ means establishing a mapping between, in some principled way, either
individual models of the fundamental, ‘reducing’, theory to individual models of the higher-level,
‘reduced’, theory, or ‘generic’ models of the reducing theory to ‘generic’ models of the reduced
theory, or the totality or near-totality of models of the reducing theory to the totality or near-
totality of models of the reduced theory. It will not suffice to just procure a merely mathematical
expression of such a mapping; instead, any formal articulation of it will need to be supplemented by
a demonstration of its ‘physical salience’ (Huggett and Wu¨thrich 2013). To start with the obvious,
the map from the set of quantum states to the set of classical spacetimes should not be expected
to be bijective, but many-to-one as there will be multiple distinct quantum states with the same
classical limit.36 Furthermore, there will be no classical analogue for some sets of quantum states.
Also, the quantization of a classical theory might not guarantee the re-emergence of the classical
structure from the resulting quantum theory, due to interpretational issues (Butterfield and Isham
2001, 80).
So far, the classical limit of LQG (and many other quantum theories of gravity) has resisted
understanding. The difficulties tend to be of two disparate kinds. First, there are technical intrica-
cies. Secondly, and of present interest, there are numerous conceptual and interpretational issues.
This is where philosophers can hope to make contributions by helping to explore the conceptual
landscape, to map possibilities, and, more concretely, bring the literature on emergence and reduc-
tion to bear on the problems at hand. To date, only few philosophers have ventured into this area.
I hope that more will follow—and there are hopeful signs. But still, Butterfield and Isham (1999)
and Butterfield and Isham (2001) constitute more or less the complete philosophical literature on
emergence in canonical quantum gravity, together with my dissertation (Wu¨thrich 2006, §9.2), on
which the remainder of this section is based.
A caveat before we proceed to portray the emergence scheme proposed by Jeremy Butterfield
and Chris Isham and articulate its application to LQG and hence to the emergence of the full
spacetime, rather than just time, as Butterfield and Isham do. As we noticed above (in §2.1), LQG
is not a complete theory in that the ‘dynamics’ is not well understood and in this sense the physical
Hilbert space has not yet been isolated. Therefore, what follows below is limited to the kinematical
level. This has some of the advantages of theft over honest toil, as we can thus circumvent the
notorious problem of time, which of course Butterfield and Isham address. But it brings with it the
distinct disadvantage that the following remains preliminary and must thus be taken with a grain
of salt.
4.1 The Butterfield-Isham scheme
Let us then orient our conceptualization of the problem toward the extant literature on emergence
in canonical quantum gravity. Similarly to my suggestion above, Butterfield and Isham (1999, 2001)
35The remainder of this section draws on Wu¨thrich (2006, §9).
36Consider the n-body problem: while the phase space of states of an n-particle system in a physical space of m
dimensions is topologically R2mn and therefore finite-dimensional in classical mechanics, the corresponding quantum
space of states is the infinite-dimensional Hilbert space L2(Rmn), the space of square-integrable functions on Rmn.
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propose to regard quantization and emergence as two distinct, somewhat inverse, and independent
strategies for solving the problem of quantum gravity. Butterfield and Isham consider various
potentially helpful explications of the concept of emergence. As it turns out, all of them cast
emergence as a reductive relation. As we have seen in §3.1, this usage is consonant with the physics
literature, but dissonant with the one in general philosophy. Given the richness and diversity of
the literature on reductive relations between theories, Butterfield and Isham (1999) conclude that
this should be taken to sustain the conclusion that there may not be a single concept of reduction
to fit all instances considered, not even if the analysis is confined to physics.37
Butterfield and Isham (1999) distinguish three ways in which theories (or their concepts, en-
tities, laws, or models) can stand in a reductive relation to one another: definitional extension,
supervenience, and emergence. The first typically assumes a syntactic understanding of theories,
i.e. it understands a theory as a deductively closed set of propositions. Applying Butterfield and
Isham’s definition of it to the case at hand, one could say that GR is a definitional extension of
LQG iff it is possible to add to LQG definitions of all non-logical symbols of GR such that every
theorem of GR can be proven in LQG thus augmented. The concept of definitional extension is
attractive because it gives us a clear understanding of how two theories, one of which is a defini-
tional extension of the other, relate to one another. Thus, definitional extension goes a long way
to explain why the predecessor theory was as successful as it was and why it breaks down where in
fact it does. However, we do not expect the relation between GR and LQG to be as clear-cut as it
is between Newtonian mechanics and special relativity, where the concept of definitional extension
admits a rather straightforward application. In order to determine whether or not GR is a defini-
tional extension of LQG, one would need to know how to recover the classical limit. Unless there
is at least some progress in the recovery of the classical limit of LQG, the concept of definitional
extension cannot usefully be applied to the case at stake. One would expect, to be sure, that
relating LQG to GR will involve approximations such that general-relativistic propositions only
hold approximately in LQG, and only under certain conditions. More specifically, one first extends
the definitions of LQG such as to make it conceptually sufficiently potent to be able to prove all
theorems of an intermediate theory, from which GR can, in a well-understood way, be recovered as
an approximation. This process of approximation can be defined as follows:
Definition 6 (Approximating procedure). An approximating procedure designates the process of
either neglecting some physical magnitudes, and justifying such neglect, or selecting a proper subset
of states in the state space of the approximating theory, and justifying such selection, or both, in
order to arrive at a theory whose values of physical quantities remain sufficiently close to those of
appropriately related quantities in the theory to be approximated.
But all of this goes beyond the concept of definitional extension and shall be discussed below
when I will discuss approximation as a form of emergence.38
The second relation considered by Butterfield and Isham is supervenience. Per definitionem,
GR supervenes on LQG iff all its predicates supervene on the predicates of LQG, with respect to a
fixed set A of objects on which both predicates of GR and of LQG are defined. The set of predicates
of GR is said to supervene on the set of predicates in LQG, given a set A of objects, iff any two
objects in A that differ in what is predicated of them in GR must also differ in what is predicated
37No attempt shall be made to substantially consider the wider literature on the topic. Cf. Spector (1978) for
an analysis of various proposals for reduction as an inter-theoretic relation, with a particular eye on the physical
sciences.
38The clause “appropriately related quantities in the theory to be approximated” in Definition 6 above occludes
substantive work that must be completed to achieve such “appropriate relation”. I am grateful to Erik Curiel for
pushing me on this point—I most certainly deserve the pushing here.
22
of them in LQG. The fact that supervenience requires a stable set A of objects underlying both
theories, i.e. an identical ontology on which the ideologies of both theories are defined, renders it
rather useless in the present case. In a very rough way, the ontology of both theories of course
contains the gravitational field. But the finer structure of the ontologies of both theories do not
resemble each other: in LQG, one might perhaps find loops, or spin networks, or more generally
the inhabitants of the physical Hilbert space in its ontology, while in GR, no such objects can be
found. Hence, supervenience, at least as defined above, does not offer any help in understanding
the relation between GR and LQG. Of course, the requirement that the set A must underlie both
theories can be relaxed: one could instead demand that the set A of objects on which the sets P1
and P2 of properties figuring in the two theories are defined must be closed under compositional
operations such as mereological sums or the formation of sets. The sets P1 and P2 would then be
defined with respect to some base individuals, forming subsets A1 and A2 of A. Typically, these
predications would induce some properties on the non-basic composite objects. Conceivably, this
relaxation might be sufficient to overcome the disjointness of the sets A1 and A2.39
Consequently, we should not harbour any hope that GR either is a definitional extension of
LQG or supervenes on LQG. However, if one admits a sufficiently liberal notion of emergence, hope
resurges. The third broadly reductive relation proposed by Butterfield and Isham, and termed
‘emergence’ by them, fits the bill:
Definition 7 (Emergence). For Butterfield and Isham, a theory T1 emerges from another theory
T2 iff there exists either a limiting or an approximating procedure to relate the two theories (or a
combination of the two).
The definition of ‘approximating procedure’ was given in Definition 6; here is the one for ‘limiting
procedure’:
Definition 8 (Limiting procedure). A limiting procedure is taking the mathematical limit of some
physically relevant parameters, in general in a particular order, of the underlying theory in order
to arrive at the emergent theory.
For it to have any prayer of sufficing to relate two theories, a limiting procedure as envisioned by
Butterfield and Isham must be accompanied by a specification of a map between the theories that
relates at least some of their algebraic or geometric structures.40 For both technical and conceptual
reasons, one should not expect that the emergence of GR from LQG can be understood only
as a simple limiting procedure. Carlo Rovelli (2004, §6.7.1) delivers an account of how limiting
procedures alone are incapable of establishing the missing link. He relates how loop quantum
gravitists have not suspected that quantum space might turn out to have a discrete structure during
the period from the discovery of the loop representation of GR around 1988 to the derivation of
the spectra of the area and volume operators in 1995. He reminisces how during this period
researchers believed that the classical, macroscopic geometry could be gained by taking the limit
of a vanishing lattice constant of the lattice of loops. This limiting procedure was taken to run
analogously to letting the lattice constant of a lattice field theory go to zero and thus define a
conventional QFT. With this model in mind, something remarkable happened when people tried
to construct so-called weave states which are characterized as approximating a classical metric:
when the quantum states were defined as the limit one gains when the spatial loop density grows
to infinity, i.e. when the loop size is assumed to go to zero, it turned out that the approximation
did not become increasingly accurate as the limit was approached. This can be taken as a clear
39I wish to thank Jeremy Butterfield for suggesting this relaxation.
40Thanks to Erik Curiel for holding me to task here.
23
indication that taking this limit was physically inappropriate. What was observed instead was
that eigenvalues of the area and volume operators increased. This, of course, meant that the areas
and volumes of the spatial regions under consideration also increased. In other words, the physical
density of the loops did not increase when the ‘lattice constant’ was decreased. The physical density
of loops, it turned out, remains unaffected by how large the lattice constant is chosen; it is simply
given by a dimensional constant of the theory itself, Planck’s constant. This result is interpreted
to mean that there is a minimal physical scale. Or, in Rovelli’s words, “more loops give more size,
not a better approximation to a given [classical] geometry.” (ibid.) The loops, it turns out, have an
intrinsic physical size. Taking this limit, then, does not change the structure from discrete quantum
states to smooth manifolds. It just does not change anything in the physics, except that we look
at larger volumes. As some of the features of the classical geometry such as smoothness cannot be
reduced to or identified with properties of the quantum states of the more fundamental theory, GR
in toto does not reduce to LQG. Thus, a limiting procedure, at least if used in isolation, will just
not do the trick.
On the conceptual side, a limiting procedure never eliminates superposition states, which of
course are generic in a quantum theory. For this reason alone, a limiting procedure cannot succeed
in recovering a classical theory from a quantum one. As argued by Klaas Landsman (2006), the
classical world only emerges from the quantum theory if some quantum states and some observables
of the quantum theory are neglected, and some limiting procedure is executed. According to his
view, to be discussed below, relating the classical with the quantum world thus takes both, the
limiting as well as the approximating, procedures.
Turning to approximations then, a series of theories the last of which will mimic classical space-
times via approximations needs to be constructed. First, let us consider what the ‘approximandum’,
the classical theory to be approximated, should be. In GR, and in quantum theories based on it,
one standardly, and perhaps somewhat unprincipledly, distinguishes between gravity and matter—
a distinction routinely downplayed in particle-physics based approaches. They differ in their role
and where they show up in the Einstein equations: gravity, the “marble” as Einstein called it,
constitutes the left-hand side of the equations and determines the spacetime geometry; matter, the
“low-grade wood”, enters the stress-energy tensor on the right-hand side. In the quantization that
led to LQG, no matter was assumed to be present: LQG results from a vacuum quantization of GR.
It would seem, therefore, that states in LQG’s physical Hilbert space should generically give rise
to semi-classical states which yield emergent classical spacetimes that are vacuum solutions. But
this expectation may be disappointed, and perhaps for a reason: it has been claimed that matter
is implicitly built into LQG and that it would therefore be a mistake to think that no matter is
present in spin network states. In particular, it may be that the very structure of the spin networks
gives rise to matter in the appropriate low-energy limit. This means that it may be advisable not
to be fixated on vacuum spacetimes.
Similarly, Hamiltonian GR is restricted to spacetime models with topology Σ × R. Should we
thus expect that the procedure for recovering relativistic spacetimes would only yield spacetimes of
such topology? While spacetimes with different topology may be suppressed and the generic result
thus be concentrated on (Σ×R)-spacetimes, the quantum structures with their combinatorial and
topologically variegated connections may lead to spacetimes with more complicated topologies than
those permitted by Hamiltonian GR.
In order to prepare the field for applying the Butterfield-Isham scheme, let us consider the
major ways in which classical physics is typically held to relate to quantum physics, as listed and
discussed, e.g., by Landsman (2006): (i) by a limiting procedure involving the limit ~→ 0 for a finite
system, (ii) by a limiting procedure involving the limit N → ∞ of a large system of N degrees
of freedom while ~ is held constant, and (iii) either by decoherence or by a consistent histories
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approach. Landsman defends the point of view that while none of these manners is individually
sufficient to understand how classicality emerges from the quantum world, they jointly suggest that
it results from ignoring certain states and certain observables from the quantum theory.41
As Landsman shows, taking limits such as N →∞, albeit ‘factual’, i.e., pertaining to our world,
and hence physically more reasonable, is mathematically just a special case of the ‘counterfactual’,
and hence physically more problematic, limit ~ → 0. Regardless of their physical salience, these
limits will in themselves not suffice because no such limit can ever resolve a quantum superposition
state into a classical state. Thus, something more will be necessary, and that is where many
think ‘decoherence’ will come into play. The main idea of the program of decoherence is that
the generically assumed presence of interference in quantum states is suppressed by the system’s
interaction with the ‘environment’, such as is thought to occur in the measurement process.42
Decoherence, then, is the phenomenon that pure quantum states, by virtue of their interaction
with the system’s ‘environment’, evolve, over very short time spans, from superposition states to
‘almost’ mixed states with classical probability distributions but ‘almost’ no quantum interference
left. Roughly speaking, decoherence leaves the quantum system, to a high approximation, in an
eigenstate of a macroscopically relevant operator; the classical probabilities of the resulting mixed
states then only reflect our ignorance as to which eigenstate the system’s in.
Given that the system at stake is the universe, and all of it, of course, the notion that ‘envi-
ronmental’ degrees of freedom are those which decohere the system must be generalized so as to
include ‘internal’ degrees of freedom of the system. This does not mean that the system is put
in a mixed state from the beginning—that would be begging the question, as a referee correctly
remarked—, but instead to ‘coarse grain’ and thereby ‘wash out’ many degrees of freedom, which
then effectively act as the environment of the ‘system’ consisting of the remaining, physically salient
degrees of freedom. This ‘internal’ environment then induces the decoherence of the originally pure
state. We will return to this ‘cosmological’ problem below in the specific context of LQG.
The cosmological problem thus requires that we operate with a generalized notion of decoher-
ence, which does not rely on a decohering system being embedded in an environment which is
literally external to it. There is, however, a second issue that needs to be addressed. Decoherence
is usually understood as a dynamical process of a system interacting with a large number of ‘en-
vironmental’ degrees of freedom. How should we conceive of a dynamical process in the general
quantum-gravitational context in which time itself is part of the system at stake and, at least for
canonical approaches, in which we face the nasty problem of time? Unfortunately, I have no solu-
tion to offer here, but can only note the puzzling problem and venture a guess as to the direction in
which its resolution may have to go. In my view, the solution will come from a considered under-
standing of how dynamical processes such as decoherence can co-emerge with spacetime such that
the emergence of the former facilitates the emergence of the latter, and vice versa, to let dynamics
and spacetime mutually enable one another.
In sum, if—and only if—a theory of decoherence manages to give us a handle on how to iden-
tify the relevant degrees of freedom, and under what circumstances the interaction between these
degrees of freedom and those which were not picked out as ‘environmental’ leads to a suppression
of interference, and how this suppression works in detail, particularly concerning its ‘dynamics’,
then we will have a mechanism that ‘drives the system’ to the right sorts of semi-classical quan-
tum states. In other words, such a mechanism would then justify the selection of the subset of
states (and of a subset of physical magnitudes) we made in what Butterfield and Isham called the
‘approximating procedure’.
41For a more thorough discussion of Landsman’s argument, cf. Wu¨thrich (2006, §9.2.1).
42For reviews of decoherence, see Bacciagaluppi (2012) and Schlosshauer (2004).
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Figure 3: The Butterfield-Isham scheme transposed to the present case.
In general outline, then, following Butterfield and Isham’s proposal will lead to a two-step
procedure, as illustrated in Figure 3. The first step consists of an approximating procedure, driving
the generic quantum states, by some physical mechanism or other, into the semi-classical states,
which are more closely related to classical states. The second step involves a limiting procedure
relating these semi-classical states to states in the classical phase space, denoted in Figure 3 by
Γ. Regardless of how the details of this story work out, one thing is clear: a whole host of issues
known from the traditional problem of understanding the relation between the quantum and the
classical world will arise.
4.2 Applying it the Butterfield-Isham scheme
The thesis—or should I say the ‘promissory note’—to be suggested in the remainder of this essay
asserts that at least to the extent to which LQG is a consistent and complete theory, (a close cousin
of) GR can be seen to emerge from LQG if a delicately chosen ordered combination of approxi-
mations and limiting procedures is applied. This note is yet to be redeemed. All approaches to
finding the semi-classical and classical limits of LQG are confined, to date, to using the kinematical
Hilbert space HK rather than the physical Hilbert space H as their starting point. This raises
the concern of both the viability and the meaningfulness of relating the kinematical states to cor-
responding classical spacetimes, or spaces. But concerns like these, although perhaps ultimately
critical, should not keep us from attempting to get a grasp on what it means to draw the classical
limit of the background-independent QFT as it stands now (and has been sketched above), as it
may turn out to be an eminent help in the construction of the physical Hilbert space itself. To be
sure, even the relationship between kinematic LQG and classical theories is ill-understood. Let me
sketch, however, how preliminary work by physicists might bear out the Butterfield-Isham scheme.
The rough idea of constructing semi-classical states from the kinematical Hilbert space HK is to
find those kinematical states which correspond to almost flat three-metrics, i.e. to three-geometries
where the quantum fluctuations are believed to be negligibly small. Two major approaches to
construct semi-classical theories dominate the extant literature, the so-called ‘weave state approach’
and the ansatz using coherent states. The latter has been pioneered by Thomas Thiemann and
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Oliver Winkler.43 Other proposals include Madvahan Varandarajan’s ‘photon Fock states’ and
generalizations thereof (Ashtekar and Lewandowski 2001; Varadarajan 2000), and the Ashtekar
group’s ‘shadow states’ (Ashtekar et al. 2003).44 The remainder of this essay shall be dedicated,
however, to the most prominent approach of constructing semi-classical states, the so-called ‘weave
states’.
The idea of a weave state originally introduced by Ashtekar, Rovelli, and Smolin (1992),45
revolves around selecting spin network states that are eigenstates of the geometrical operators for
the volume of a (spatial) region R with eigenvalues which approximate the corresponding classical
values for the volume of R as determined by the classical gravitational field. Simultaneously,
these selected spin network states are eigenstates of the geometrical area operator for a surface
S. More technically, consider a macroscopic three-dimensional region R of spacetime with the
two-dimensional surface S and the three-dimensional gravitational field eia(~x) defined for all ~x ∈ R.
This gravitational field defines a metric field qab(~x) = eia(~x)e
j
b(~x)ηij(~x), where ηab is the Minkowski
metric, for which it is possible to construct a spin network state |S〉 such that |S〉 approximates
the metric qab for sufficiently large scales ∆  `Pl, where `Pl is the Planck length, in a yet to be
rigorously specified sense.46 Classically, the area of a two-dimensional surface S ⊂ M and the
volume of a three-dimensional region R ⊂M with respect to a (sufficiently well-behaved) fiducial
gravitational field 0eia are given by (Rovelli 2004, §2.1.4)
A[0e,S] =
∫
|d2S|, (11)
V[0e,R] =
∫
|d3R|, (12)
where the relevant measures for the integrals are determined by 0eia. This fiducial metric is typically,
but not necessarily, chosen to be flat. The requirement that the spin network state |S〉 must
approximate the classical geometry for sufficiently large scales is made precise by demanding that
|S〉 be a simultaneous eigenstate of the area operator Aˆ and the volume operator Vˆ as mentioned
above with eigenvalues equal to the classical values as given by (11) and (12), respectively, up to
small corrections of the order of `Pl/∆:
Aˆ(S)|S〉 = (A[0e,S] +O(`2Pl/∆2)) |S〉, (13)
Vˆ(R)|S〉 = (V[0e,R] +O(`3Pl/∆3)) |S〉. (14)
If a spin network state |S〉 satisfies these requirements, then it is called a weave state. In fact, the
length scale ∆, which is large compared to the Planck length `Pl, characterizes the weave states,
which are for this reason sometimes denoted by |∆〉 in the literature. At scales much smaller than
∆, the quantum features of spacetime would become relevant, while at scales of order ∆ or larger,
43For a review, cf. Sahlmann et al. (2001) and Thiemann (2007, §11.2). Thiemann’s book also discusses weave
states in §11.1 and the photon Fock states in §11.3.
44As Thiemann (2007, §11) points out, there are deep connections between the various semi-classical programmes.
45For an intuitive introduction, see Rovelli (2004, §6.7.1). The picture is that of the gravitational field like a
(quantum cloud of) fabric(s) of weaves which appears to be smooth if seen from far but displays a discrete structure
if examined more closely. Hence weave states.
46The ‘upper case’ spin network states |S〉 live in K?, the pre-kinematical Hilbert space, i.e. the Hilbert space
containing all spin network states which solve the Gauss constraints, but not necessarily the spatial diffeomorphism
constraints. Thus, the spin network states in K? are not represented by abstract graphs, as are those in the full
kinematical Hilbert space HK , but as embedded graphs on a background manifold. This choice is just conveniently
following the established standard in the literature on weave states; we will see below in Footnote 47 that this poses
no problem as everything can be directly carried over to the spatially diffeomorphically invariant level.
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the weave states exhibit a close approximation to the corresponding classical geometry in the sense
that it determines the same areas and volumes as the classical metric qab. In this sense, the weave
states are semi-classical approximations.
It should be noted that the correspondence between weave states and classical spacetimes is
many-to-one. In other words, equations (13) and (14) do not determine the state |S〉 uniquely
from a given three-metric qab. The reason for this is that these equations only put constraints on
values averaged over all of S and R, respectively, and we have assumed ex constructione that these
regions are large compared to the Planck scale. Of course, there are many spin network states
with these averaged properties, but only one classical metric which exactly corresponds to these
averages values. The situation can be thought of as somewhat analogous to thermodynamics, where
a physical system with many microscopic degrees of freedom has many different microscopic states
with the same averaged, macroscopic properties such as temperature.47
Apart from a serious difficulty in constructing semi-classical weave states corresponding to
classical Minkowski spacetime,48 it seems as if the notion of approximation as captured in Definition
6 and the Butterfield-Isham scheme might bear fruit in relating semi-classical weave states to
classical spacetimes (or at least spaces). If the weave states are taken to be simultaneous eigenstates
of the area and volume operators, as they are in (13) and (14), then some physical quantities must
be neglected, viz. all those operators constructed from connection operators, since the ‘geometrical’
eigenstates are maximally spread in these operators, and the kinematical (weave) states must be
carefully selected to only include those which are peaked around the geometrical values determined
by the fiducial metric. It is at least questionable, however, whether the neglect of connection-based
operators can be justified. If it cannot, then only semi-classical states which are peaked in both the
connection and the triad basis, and are peaked in such a manner as to approximate classical states,
should be considered. In this case, we would still only have a selection of states, but perhaps no
operators, or no physically salient ones, which are being ignored.
None of this gives us just as yet a physical mechanism that drives generic kinematical states to
the semi-classical weave states. Just as above in the general case, decoherence is widely assumed
to offer such a mechanism in the context of weave states. But this brings what I termed above the
‘cosmological problem’ back into the fold: how should such a story possibly apply to the present
context where the spin network states are supposed to be the quantum account of space—and
all of it. If we thus think of an ‘environment’ as something external to the system for which it
is an environment, then relying on such an environment in our story implies that there must be
something outside of space. But this is clearly incoherent. Not all hope is lost, however, as there
are at least two ways to escape the incoherence. First, as in the general case above, one might
conceive of decoherence not in terms of external, environmental degrees of freedom which interact
with the system, but instead as interactions among different degrees of freedom of the system itself.
This will presuppose a partition of the system’s degrees of freedom into ‘salient’ ones and mere
‘background’; but there is no reason that this couldn’t be done in a principled fashion.
Secondly, we may reconceptualize LQG’s subject matter. We may, more specifically, conceive of
47The weave states as introduced above have merely been defined at the pre-kinematic level, i.e. they are not
formulated in terms invariant under spatial diffeomorphisms (cf. also Footnote 46). The reason for this choice lies
mostly in that this is the canonical choice in the literature, but also because in this way, the weave states can be
directly related to three-metrics, rather than equivalence classes of three-metrics. This, however, does not constitute a
problem whatsoever, as the characterization of weave states carries over into the context of diffeomorphically invariant
spin network states in HK , as follows. If we introduce a map Pdiff : K? → HK which projects states in K? related
by a spatial diffeomorphism unto the same element of HK , then the state HK 3 |s〉 = Pdiff|S〉 is a weave state of
the classical three-geometry [qab], i.e., the equivalence class of three-metrics qab under spatial diffeomorphisms, just
in case |S〉 is a weave state of the classical three-metric qab as defined above.
48For details, cf. Wu¨thrich (2006, 181).
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areas and volumes as local properties of the quantum gravitational field, just as these geometrical
properties were local in GR. As was explicated in §2.1, given a region R of quantum space, e.g.
a chunk of space in our laboratory, each node of the spin network state represents a grain of
such a space as it contributes to the eigenvalue of the volume operator. Similarly, each link from
a node within R to a node outside of R, i.e. each link which intersects the boundary S of R,
contributes to the eigenvalue of the area operator. If we had measurement devices at our disposal
with Planck-scale accuracy, we could, in principle, measure the volume and the surface area of a
region of space(time) given in our lab. Such a measurement would essentially amount to counting
(and weighing) the nodes within a region as well as counting (and weighing) the links which leave
the region. If the region R considered does not encompass all of space, but only a delimited piece
of it, then of course finding an environment for such a ‘mid-sized’ region is straightforward and the
cosmological problem dissolves. In fact, it would arguably also resolve the dynamical problem, as
the lab frame would offer a context in which dynamical processes unravel. It could thus be the
case that if we performed an area or volume measurement on surface S or region R, respectively,
then we would find the quantum state of this ‘mid-sized’ region decohered into an eigenstate of the
relevant operator, and thus into a weave state.
Once we have completed this stage, and we have found semi-classical states which approximate
classical states, then a limiting procedure can be executed. Such a limiting procedure will involve
taking the limit `Pl/∆→ 0, which will make the small corrections in (13) and (14) disappear. This
limit can be performed by either having ∆ go to infinity, or `Pl go to zero (or both). The first choice
corresponds to letting the size of the spatial region R grow beyond all limits, and thus resembles
the ‘factual’ limit N → ∞ as discussed above. The second choice, letting the Planck size go to
zero, corresponds, accordingly, to the ‘counterfactual’ case ~ → 0. With the second choice, but
arguably not the first, we leave the realm of the quantum theory and arrive at a strictly classical
description of the spatial geometry.
It should be noted that none of this solves the measurement problem. Only a full solution
of the measurement problem will ultimately give us complete comprehension of the emergence of
classicality from a reality which is fundamentally quantum. But to solve this problem is hard
in non-relativistic quantum mechanics, harder still if special relativity must be incorporated, and
completely mystifying once we move to fully relativistic quantum theories of gravity. In light of this,
I submit that we would have reason to uncork our champagne even if we only managed to articulate
a complete and consistent quantum theory of gravity with a well-understood approximation to semi-
classical states and a somewhat rigorous limiting procedure connecting these semi-classical states
to classical states of the gravitational field.
5 Conclusion
We have seen how classical space and time ‘disappear’ in quantum gravity and considered a sketch
of how they might re-emerge from the fundamental, not obviously spatiotemporal structure. Even
though the situation is technically and conceptually more demanding overall and even though a
case must be made for the applicability of a traditional measurement concept more specifically, I
hope the reader has also recognized that the way in which classicality emerges from the quantum
theory does not radically differ from ordinary quantum mechanics, at least along some dimensions
of comparison.
The project of analyzing the emergence of spacetime, and hence of classicality, from quantum
theories of gravity, which often deny at least some aspects of spatiotemporality, is relevant for
two reasons. First, important foundational questions concerning the interpretation of, and the
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relation between, theories are addressed, which contributes to the conceptual clarifications in the
foundations of physics arguably necessary to achieve a breakthrough. Not only philosophers of
physics will contribute to this project, of course. They are not even likely to shoulder the lion’s
share, which will still fall on the physicists. But they can nevertheless bring their unique skill set to
the table, to the benefit, it is hoped, of the entire dinner party. Secondly, and conversely, quantum
gravity is rich with implications for specifically philosophical, and particularly metaphysical, issues
concerning not just space and time, but also causation, reduction, and even modality. Quantum
gravity thus turns out to be a very fertile ground for the philosopher. Altogether, I take it, there
is no reason for philosophers to keep aloof from these exciting developments in the foundations of
physics.
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